Introduction
This chapter seeks to review attempts by economists and statisticians to model the demand for online lottery games such as lotto. There is an overview of published research and further illustrations are drawn from results obtained with my co-authors in a number of current lottery-related projects. Throughout I attempt to draw out the extent to which the modelling exercises reported can illuminate debate on major trends and issues in the world of lotteries.
Lotteries operate in a fast changing and increasingly competitive gaming sector. Worldwide, potential players enjoy new opportunities to gamble via the internet, whether on lotteries, betting or forms of gaming (such as poker) to which they may not previously have had any access at all. The availability of cheaper versions of their own products, and of new potential substitutes, poses a threat to established state-owned operators in Europe and elsewhere and makes it problematic that their traditionally high take-out rates can be maintained.
Within Europe, state-sanctioned monopolists also face legal challenges based on claims that the freedom to trade across national boundaries within the European Union should apply equally to gambling as to other services. Thus, for example, bookmakers based in the UK have attempted to assert their right to trade in Italy and Greece and have challenged the legality of the policy in The Netherlands that internet service providers may not permit access to gaming sites located outside the country.
Many such cases remain outstanding at the European Court of Justice and their outcomes will determine the body of case law on which the future shape of gambling in the European Union will depend. Early judgements, in the Schindler and Gambelli cases, recognised that member states may restrict the availability of gambling services for social reasons, but only if rigorous conditions are met. Barriers to trade within the Union could not be based merely on an intention to protect existing tax revenue or profits. Any restrictions that were maintained had to be non-discriminatory, proportionate to the objectives and consistent with other policies. The conditions set down have been widely interpreted as signalling that state-owned enterprises providing lotteries, betting and other forms of gaming are unlikely in the future to be allowed to enjoy the territorial monopolies under which they have operated until now. So, on several fronts, European lotteries face intensification of competition. This poses a number of issues for them and for the societies in which they operate. In general terms, increased competition drives down prices.
2 For example, horse betting is popular in both France and the United Kingdom. In France, bettors can wager only through the state-sanctioned monopoly Pari Mutuel-Urbain, where take-out is more than 27 per cent; in the United Kingdom, betting is available at a number of rival operators and they typically retain only 13 per cent of stakes. In any jurisdiction where new entry is permitted, there seems little reason to suppose other than that the current national monopolies will see the price the betting market will bear driven down to the levels observed in Britain. Any attempts by governments to tax bets to compensate for loss of profits from state-owned betting operations are likely to be frustrated if their citizens are permitted to bet offshore via the internet.
